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Abstract
This paper derives the Ramsey optimal policy for taxing asset income in a model where
government expenditure is a function of net output or the inputs that produce it. Extending
Judd (1999), I demonstrate that the canonical result that the optimal tax on capital income
is zero in the medium to long term is a special case of a more general model. Employing a
vector error correction model to estimate the relationship between government consumption
and net output or the factor inputs that generate it for the United States between 1948Q1
to 2015Q4, I demonstrate that this special case is empirically implausible, and show how a
cointegrating vector can be used to determine the optimal tax schedule. I simulate a version
of the model using the empirical estimates to measure the welfare implications of changing
the tax rate on asset income, and contrast these results with those generated in a version
of the model where government consumption is purely exogenous. The shifting pattern
of welfare measurements conrms the theoretical results. I calculate that the prevailing
eective tax rate on net asset income in the US between 1970 and 2014 averaged 0.449.
Hence abolishing the tax completely does generate welfare improvements, though only by the
equivalent of between 1.103 and 1.616% percent permanent increase in consumption|well
under half the implied welfare benet when the endogeneity of the government consumption
is ignored. The maximum welfare improvement from shifting part of the burden of tax from
capital to labor is the equivalent of a permanent increase in consumption of between only
1.491 and 1.858%, and is attained when the tax rate on asset income is lowered to between
0.148 and 0.186. Allowing the tax rate to vary over time raises the maximum welfare benet
to 1.865%. All the results are very robust to a wide range of elasticities of labor supply.
JEL classication: E62, H21, H50
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1 Introduction
If governments must fund their activities by taxing income, on which sources of income should
the burden fall? In this paper I consider a general optimal growth model, one in which there
is a direct link between either aggregate net output or the factor inputs that produce it, and
the share of output allocated to government consumption. In such an economy the canonical
results of zero taxation of capital income no longer hold. I demonstrate that for an empirically
plausible specication of the link between government consumption and either net output or
factor inputs, there is a simple relationship that can be employed to determine the optimal rate
of tax on asset income and estimate a range of appropriate rates for the United States. Finally,
I measure the welfare implications of shifting the burden of taxation between asset income and
labor earnings. I demonstrate that the optimal tax rate on asset income is indeed positive, but
that given the prevailing rates of taxation in the United States, the maximal welfare benet that
can be obtained from adopting an optimal policy is much smaller than what usually emerges
when government consumption expenditure is assumed to be exogenously determined.
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) demonstrated how the tax on interest income depends on the
complementarity or substitutability between consumption and leisure in a representative agent's
instantaneous utility function. Additive separability between the two, implies the optimal tax
rate on interest is zero. Chamley (1981) was the rst to calculate the excess burden associated
with the taxation of income from endogenously determined capital in a complete general equi-
librium setting. Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) extended this work and demonstrated that in
standard optimal growth models, models where capital and consumption converge to a steady
state, the optimal long-run policy sets the tax rate on income from capital to zero. Judd (1999)
showed that for a wider class of dynamic models, particularly models that do not necessarily
converge to a single steady state or balanced growth path, optimal policy still entails setting
the tax rate on capital income to at least an average of zero over time.
In Chamley (1981), (1986), and Judd (1985), taxes are imposed to nance a xed amount of
government expenditure. By contrast, in Judd's (1999) more general formulation, government
expenditure is a public good that enters the utility function of the representative agent. In none
of this work is government expenditure directly related to economic output or its production.
In Section 2, I adopt Judd's (1999) approach to determining optimal scal policy in models that
may not necessarily possess a single steady state or balanced growth path, but I distinguish
between public spending on transfer payments and government consumption. The latter is rst,
a general function of factor inputs, and then more specically a function of the economic output
the factors generate. Zero taxation of asset income does not emerge here as an optimal policy
except as a special case. Instead, if we assume that government consumption and domestic
output, net of depreciation, are related to each other in a particular way|one that can be
easily estimated as a cointegrating vector|a simple formula for the optimal tax rate on asset
income emerges; a formula independent of government spending on transfer payments.
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Figure 1: Capital, net domestic product and government consumption, quarterly in the United
States, deated using the NDP deator, 1948Q1 to 2015Q4, natural logarithmic scale. Data
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; U.S. Department
of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis seasonally adjusted variables and Fernald \A Quar-
terly, Utilization-Adjusted Series on TFP." Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco: Capital, An-
nual Net Assets [K1TTOTL1ES000] interpolated using quarterly changes in private capital from
Fernald; Net Domestic Product [A362RC1Q027SBEA]; Government Consumption Expenditures
[A955RC1Q027SBEA]; Deator [A362RG3Q086SBEA]. http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
and http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/indicators-data/total-factor-productivity-tfp/.
Consider the behaviour of government consumption expenditure, capital and net domestic
product in the United States from 1948 onward in Figure 1. Throughout this work I use
nominal data deated by the net domestic product deator|the focus here is on the nancing
of government consumption expenditure, so real volume measures of government outputs would
generate a distorted picture of how much net output is devoted to government consumption
or what portion of the capital stock is devoted to its production. Whereas the rise in the
amount spent on transfer payments has caused total government expenditure to grow at a
faster pace than the economy as a whole, the portion of net domestic output devoted to direct
government spending on goods and services closely tracks overall net domestic product|an
impression reinforced if we consider in Figure 2, either the evolution of the share of government
consumption in net domestic product, or the ratio of the trend components of each series.
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As I demonstrate in the rst part of Section 3, both are integrated series and there exists
a cointegrating relationship between them that can be captured by estimating a vector error
correction model.
In contrast to Chamley (1981), (1986), and Judd (1985), (1999), in the model in Section 2
more capital accumulation leads not only to higher output but to higher government consump-
tion as well. Hence in the absence of a tax on the income it generates, the amount of capital the
economy will accumulate will be inneciently high. As it this underlying relationship between
government consumption and capital that determines the optimal rate of taxation, in the second
part of Section 3, I estimate the cointegrating relationship between government consumption
and factor inputs. Forecasts generated by these very same vector error correction models can
then be used to provide estimates of the long-run optimal tax rate on asset income.
Finally in Section 4, I incorporate the estimates from Section 3 into the calibration of an
optimal growth model with elastic labor supply and measure the welfare implications of shifting
the tax burden from income derived from assets to labor earnings. As has been demonstrated
in previous studies by Coleman (2000), Domeij and Heathcote (2004), Eerola and Maattanen
(2013), _Imrohoroglu (1998), Laitner (1995) and Lucas (1990), the prevailing rate of tax on
asset income is suciently high in the United States that in the context of a representative
agent framework, eliminating it completely and shifting the burden to labor income has the
potential to generate a substantial positive welfare benet. Qualitatively this eect is retained,
but if government consumption ows are directly related to economic activity (production or
capital accumulation) the magnitude of the benet will be signicantly smaller. Indeed, rather
than eliminating the tax completely, a more modest shift, one that lowers the eective tax
rate on net asset income from its recent long-run average of 0.449 to between 0.148 and 0.186
(depending on the model specication chosen), generates the greatest (though still relatively
modest) improvement in welfare, equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of between
1.491% and 1.858%. These numbers can be improved upon, though only to a very small extent,
if the tax rate is permitted to shift slightly over time in the vicinity of this range.
As far back as Adolph Wagner (1883) and Henry Carter Adams (1898), Economists, have
postulated a close relationship between the amount of government expenditure and the overall
size of the economy. Indeed, a sizable empirical literature has developed to examine and explain
this relationship, starting with the seminal work by Peacock and Wiseman (1961) for the United
Kingdom. Yet rarely is this feature incorporated into models studying optimal scal policy.
Taken together, the theoretical and empirical results of this work suggest that failure to consider
the relationship between the share of net output devoted to government activity that taxes help
nance and the overall size and productive capacity of the economy in general has the potential
to skew our conclusions regarding the best allocation of the tax burden across the dierent
input factors.
In 1990, Robert E. Lucas wrote:
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Figure 2: The ratios of government consumption expenditure to net domestic product or capital
stock in the United States, combined with the ratios of each of their trend components from
Hodrick Prescott Filters (the value of the penalty parameter is set to =1600), 1948Q1 to
2015Q4.
When I left graduate school, in 1963, I believed that the single most desirable
change in the U.S. tax structure would be the taxation of capital gains as ordinary
income. I now believe that neither capital gains nor any of the income from capital
should be taxed at all.
Yet the continued development of dynamic general equilibrium models that endogenise the
supply of capital has not settled the argument regarding the ecacy of taxing the income it
generates. Aiyagari (1995), Correia (1996), Reis (2011) and others, all nd that under conditions
of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, asymmetric information, or the inability of governments to
tax some factor inputs, Ramsey optimal policies will include some taxation of capital income.
This work implies that even in the absence of uncertainty, incomplete markets, or asymmetric
information, imposing some of the burden of funding government expenditure on capital income
can be an economically ecient policy that maximises the welfare of a representative agent,
provided there is a functional relationship between government consumption, the capital stock
and the overall size of the economy. Indeed, rather than setting the tax rate on asset income to
zero, a welfare optimising policy for the United States would imply the near equalising of net
rates of taxation across dierent sources of income. The only dierence between the tax rates
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imposed on asset income and earnings will stem from the burden of debt service, which should
fall solely on the latter.
2 Theory: Ramsey Optimal Policy
2.1 The Representative Household's Problem
We begin by reformulating Judd's (1999) optimal taxation argument in discrete time and also
alter his model to make government consumption a function of either factor inputs or the net
output they together produce. Assume an economy in which all participants are members of
households that share the instantaneous utility function u : R2+ ! R, which maps preferences
over consumption and labor, and a discount factor  2 (0; 1). Utility is strictly increasing in
consumption, and strictly decreasing in labor. I normalize the size of the initial population to
N0=1, and a representative household chooses its consumption ct and labor input lt to maximise
its innite horizon discounted utility:
max
c;l
1X
t=0
tNtu [ct; lt] (P.1)
subject to
Nt+1at+1 = Nt ( wtlt + (1 + rt) at   ptct + ht) (1)
where at represents assets (both bonds and capital); ht represents net government transfer
payments; wt, rt and pt represent the time t after tax wage rate, after-tax rate of return on
asset holding and after-tax price of consumption; the size of the population is Nt, and the net
rate of population growth between time t and t+ 1 is Nt+1=Nt   1.
Dierentiating the optimization problem P.1 with respect to ct, ct+1, lt and at+1 yields the
rst order conditions:
uc [ct; lt]  tpt = 0; (2)
ul [ct; lt] + t wt = 0; (3)
 t + t+1 (1 + rt+1) = 0; (4)
where uc [ct; lt] > 0 and ul [ct; lt] < 0 are the marginal utilities of consumption and labor,
and t is a current value costate variable that expresses the marginal utility derived by the
representative household from a positive increment to asset wealth.1
2.2 The Social Planner's Problem
Output in this economy is produced by combining aggregate capital Kt and aggregate eective
labor ztLt, which is the aggregate labor input itself Lt = Ntlt multiplied by labor augmenting
technology zt. I denote the production function as F : R2+ ! R+. Capital depreciates at the
1For the special case where 8l, ul [c; l] = 0, the rst order conditions reduce to (2) and (4) only.
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constant rate   0, and so net domestic product, dened as output net of capital depreciation
is Yt  F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt. We assume competitive rms maximise prots, so that pre-tax factor
returns rt and wt equal their marginal products. I also assume the production technology F is
homogenous of degree 1, so that in equilibrium:
rt = F1[Kt; ztLt]  ; (5)
wt = ztF2[Kt; ztLt]: (6)
The government raises revenue in each period t by selling one period bonds Bt+1, collecting a
tax on labor earnings  lt = 1  wtwt , collecting a tax at = 1  rtrt levied on income from the returns
generated by either of the two assets, physical capital or the bonds themselves, and collecting
an ad valorem tax  ct =
pt
pt
  1 on consumption ct. In this real economy we normalise the pre-
tax price of the consumption good pt to one. Together all these revenues nance government
consumption, which here is conned to that portion of government activity represented on
the expenditure side of the national accounts which is not designated as investment, nance
an exogenous stream of transfer payments, or redeem the interest and principal of all the
outstanding debt incurred in the period prior. In contrast to most of the optimal tax literature,
where government consumption is xed, or Judd (1999), where it enters the utility function of
both the representative agent and the social planner, here I assume that like output, it is a
function of both aggregate inputs, G : R2+ ! R+. The government's budget constraint is:
Bt+1 = G[Kt; ztLt] +Ht    ltwtLt   at rt (Kt +Bt) + (1 + rt)Bt    ct Ct; (7)
where Bt is the aggregate stock of government bonds at the beginning of time t, Ct = Ntct
represents aggregate consumption ows during this period, and Ht = Ntht represents aggregate
government transfer payments.
Now consider the Ramsey problem of a policy maker who chooses per-capita consumption
ct, leisure lt, the after-tax price of consumer goods pt, and after-tax factor returns rt and wt
which maximise the representative households' discounted utility:
max
c;l;r; w;p
1X
t=0
tNtu [ct; lt] (P.2)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (2) to (4), the feasibility condition:
Kt+1 = F [Kt; ztLt] G [Kt; ztLt] + (1  )Kt   Ct; (8)
and assuming the aggregate production function F is homogenous of degree one, the govern-
ment's budget constraint (7), which can be reformulated as:
Bt+1 = rt (Kt +Bt) + wtLt + Kt   F [Kt; ztLt] +G [Kt; ztLt]  (pt   1)Ct +Bt +Ht: (9)
Budget constraints (8) and (9), when combined imply (1) after it is aggregated. I assume
limt >1 jbtj <1 and also:
rt  0; (10)
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wt  0; (11)
pt  0: (12)
Dierentiating the social planner's optimization problem P.2 with respect to pt, wt, rt, t, and
the per-capita values ct, lt, kt+1, and bt+1 yields the rst order conditions:
uc [ct; lt]  kt + ctucc [ct; lt] + ltucl [ct; lt]  t (pt   1) = 0; (13)
ul [ct; lt] + zt
k
t (F2 [Kt; ztLt] G2 [Kt; ztLt]) + t ( wt   ztF2 [Kt; ztLt] + ztG2 [Kt; ztLt])
+ctucl [ct; lt] + 
l
tull [ct; lt] = 0; (14)
 t ct
pt
  ctt + pt = 0; (15)
tlt + t
l
t + 
w
t = 0; (16)
t 1Nt 1t + t (Kt +Bt) +Nt
r
t = 0; (17)
Nt 1t 1 (1 + rt) Nt

t + 
c
t pt   lt wt

= 0; (18)
 kt + kt+1 (F1 [Kt+1; zt+1Lt+1] G1 [Kt+1; zt+1Lt+1] + 1  )
+t+1 (rt +    F1 [Kt+1; zt+1Lt+1] +G1 [Kt+1; zt+1Lt+1]) = 0; (19)
 t + t+1 (1 + rt+1) = 0: (20)
where ct , 
l
t, 

t , t, 
k
t , 
r
t , 
w
t , and 
p
t are the costates variables associated with (2), (3),
(4), (8), (9), (10), (11) and (12). Straub and Werning (2015) demonstrate that under certain
conditions, a social planner will prefer policies such as setting rt = 0, 8t, that have the eect of
driving both the stock of capital and consumption to zero in the long-run, rather than interior
solutions. In what follows, I restrict my attention to interior solutions to (13) to (20) and
assume that rt = 
p
t = 
w
t = 0.
In the absence of any tax distortions, the marginal value at time t of an increment of capital
for the representative household, t > 0 is equal to its marginal value for the social planner,
kt > 0. Similarly, in a model in which taxes are not distortionary and do not generate excess
burdens, Ricardian equivalence prevails, and the neutrality of public debt held in household
asset portfolios implies that t = 0. Otherwise, as is the case here, servicing any increase in
the public debt burden entails deadweight losses so that t < 0. Following Judd (1999), I
dene t  1pt
kt t
t
, which is a measure of the social value of an increment to physical capital
when the value of private assets (comprising both capital and public debt) is held constant,
and the reciprocal of pt corrects for the distorting eect of ad-valoreum taxes paid on private
consumption. Again, in a model without distortionary taxation, pt = 1, 
k
t = t and t = 0 so
therefore t = 1.
Judd (1999) assumes that government expenditure enters the utility function as a way to
ensure that the value of t > 0. It is, however, possible to achieve the same result by placing a
few restrictions on preferences and on the production and government consumption functions.
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Lemma 1. A sucient condition that ensures that t > 0 for all ct > 0, kt > 0 and lt > 0, is
ul [ct; lt] + lull [ct; lt] + cucl [ct; lt]  0 and zt (F2 [Kt; ztLt] G2 [Kt; ztLt]) > 0.
Proof. Solving (14) for kt , subtracting t, substituting the interior solutions for (15) and (16)
for ct and 
l
t (with 
p
t = 
w
t = 0), and replacing wt using (3) yields:
kt   t =
 uc [ct; lt]ul [ct; lt] + t (ul [ct; lt] + ltull [ct; lt] + ctucl [ct; lt])
uc [ct; lt] zt (F2 [Kt; ztLt] G2 [Kt; ztLt]) : (21)
From the assumptions that uc [ct; lt] > 0 and ul [ct; lt] < 0, 
k
t   t > 0 if ul [ct; lt] + lull [ct; lt] +
cucl [ct; lt]  0 and zt (F2 [Kt; ztLt] G2 [Kt; ztLt]) > 0. Finally from (2) t > 0 and hence
t > 0.
After substituting (4), (19) and (20), the value of t evolves according to:
t+1
t
=
pt
pt+1
1 + rt+1
1 + F1 [Kt+1; zt+1Lt+1] G1 [Kt+1; zt+1Lt+1]   : (22)
The numerator in the right-hand side of (22), 1 + rt+1 when multiplied by the price ratio
pt
pt+1
,
is the cost agents in this economy face when they shift a unit of consumption between period
t and t+ 1. The denominator reects the cost of this shift in terms of production, which here
includes the portion of extra output lost to additional government consumption. Iterating (22)
from period t backwards:
t
0
=
p0
pt
tY
i=1
1 + ri
1 + F1 [Ki; ziLi] G1 [Ki; ziLi]   : (23)
Assume that along a balanced growth path the ad valoreum tax rate on consumption is
constant so that pt = p0. Comparing the growth rates for the costate variables t and t
in (4) and (20), we know the ratio t=t is always constant. If this economy converges to a
steady state or a balanced growth path, once convergence is complete, the ratio kt =t will have
converged to a constant value as well. Hence for an economy that has converged, a solution
to the social planner's problem implies the value t is a constant and (23) implies that the
sequence f1 + rigti=1 must be set to ensure the ratio t=0 is equal to one.
Theorem 1. Suppose an economy converges to a steady state or balanced growth path, then
assuming an interior solution for (13) to (20), the long-run optimal policy is to set r equal
to limt!1 F1 [Kt; ztLt]   G1 [Kt; ztLt]   . The social planner accomplishes this by setting the
long-run tax rate a equal to limt!1G1 [Kt; ztlt] = (F1 [Kt; ztlt]  ).
Proof. Follows from t=0 = 1 in (23).
Indeed, notice how the same trajectory of t=0 can be generated by choosing either the
sequence f1 + rigti=1 or the ratio p0pt . The social planner has more policy instruments than
necessary to achieve an optimal solution to P.2.
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Corollary 1. The availability of a consumption tax is not necessary to ensure a Ramsey second
best allocation associated with the optimization problem P.2.
Proof. From (4) and (20) we know that t+1t+1 =
t
t
8t. Combining (17) with (18) and inserting
the values of Kt+1 and Bt+1 from (8) and (9) yields:
t
t
( wtlt   ct)  ct + lt wt = 0:
Combining this with (16) while assuming an interior solution so that wt = 0 yields:
ct =  
t
t
ct;
which replicates (15) as long as pt = 0: Since (15) is implied by the other rst order conditions,
for any interior solution the availability to the social planner of a consumption tax does not
alter the result in Theorem 1.
In what follows, we assume that pt is always constant. A number of special cases emerge
from Theorem 1, depending on how the function G is specied. For example, if G1 [Kt; ztLt] = 0
so that government consumption is not a function of the capital stock, we recover the canonical
Chamley-Judd result of zero taxation on asset income as the long-run optimising policy. This
is the case even if G2 [Kt; ztLt] 6= 0, and government consumption is still a function of the
amount of eective labor employed in production. Alternatively if G1 [Kt; ztLt] 6= 0, then en-
dogenous government expenditure creates a wedge between the net marginal product of capital
F1 [K; zL]   , and corresponding interest rate r, that confronts individuals in this economy,
and the full marginal product of capital F1 [K; zL]   G1 [K; zL]   , as it is perceived by the
social planner. The tax rate imposed on assets a serves to compensate for this disparity.
For example, if G1 [Kt; ztLt] < 0; then any policy that encourages capital accumulation
depresses the amount of output diverted to government consumption, and the optimal policy
is to subsidise capital income by setting r to be less than r and a < 0. If G [Kt; ztLt] =
gK t (ztLt)
1+, then even in a model with exponential steady state growth, government ex-
penditure as a share of GDP still converges to a strictly positive amount, and yet the optimal
tax is still negative. Finally, if G1 [Kt; ztLt] > 0 then the optimal tax rate is positive.
In an economy in which government expenditure is exogenously determined, the long-run
supply curve for capital is innitely elastic at a given interest rate. This is why the distortions
associated with policies that lower the after-tax rate of return dominate those that directly
aect labor supply. By contrast, for the type of economies specied in Theorem 1, a change
in the tax rate on asset income alters not just the amount of capital available to produce the
consumption good, but indirectly aects the overall amount of government consumption, which
here does not have the usual lump-sum quality. Instead, government consumption is itself a
type of distortion that asset taxation serves to mitigate. This remains the case even if the
economic activity from which it is derived necessitates the government's consumption.
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Consider the case of the power function G [Kt; ztLt] = g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) , and g > 0
and  > 0. Suppose the values of zt and Nt converge to constants, and the economy converges
to a stationary steady state. Government consumption converges to a positive share of net
output and the optimal long-run tax rate on asset income is g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) 1.2 By
contrast, if we assume zt and/or Nt are growing, we must constrain the value of  to be less
than or equal to one, to ensure that government consumption does not ultimately exceed net
output. If there exists a balanced growth path and  = 1, government consumption converges
to a positive share of output g, and the long-run optimal policy will be one where the tax rate
is positive so that a = g. If, however,  < 1, and the aggregate economy is growing, then
limt!1 g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) 1 = 0, which means we recover the Chamley-Judd optimal long-
run policy of setting r = F1 [K; zL]   and a = 0 in the limit|though as I will demonstrate
below, until the economy converges, the optimal policy may be very dierent.
Theorem 1 applies to economies that have converged to a balanced growth path. What
then should be the policy if the economy does not converge to a balanced growth path but is
characterized by cycles, or, alternatively, convergence is achieved only over a very long time
horizon. Can we say anything about optimal policy in the interim?
First, the results in Theorem 1 and the after tax rate of return as t!1 do not depend on
the distorting properties of the other taxes, on the evolution of lump-sum transfers or whether
they are positive or negative. Indeed it remains valid even if in the initial period the social
planner is able to set r0 = 0 and conscate all asset income in the initial period. In that case
an optimising social planner will deploy the additional revenue from what amounts to an initial
lump sum tax towards reducing the distortionary impact of wage taxation. To see this, assume
the utility function is not a function of labor hours supplied in the market, but depends on
consumption alone, and that Ht is a policy variable. Labor taxation and transfers are now
completely interchangable and for these two policy instruments Ricardian equivalence prevail|
the shadow price of government debt t is equal to zero. Yet the reasoning behind Theorem 1
remains intact. The social planner will set the value of r = limt!1 F1 [Kt; ztLt] G1 [Kt; ztLt] 
to ensure that kt = t. More often, when analysing optimal factor taxation, we exclude the
option of resorting to lump-sum taxation as an alternative source of revenue. Suppose, in what
follows, we constrain Ht to be equal to zero.
The challenge here is that regardless of what the long-run optimum policy is, during the
initial period, the social planner might want to set the value r0 very low to exploit the time-zero
inelasticity of capital supply and replicate the now missing option of imposing a lump sum tax.
It is this reasoning that gives rise to the \bang-bang" pattern of optimal taxation described by
Chamley (1986). This is why, even though the more a sequence of tax rates on asset income
causes the value of t to deviate from one, the more it distorts the economy and generates
welfare losses, it is not possible to pin down the initial value of 0 or assume it equals one. Yet
2Ben-Gad (2003) analyses long-run optimal scal policy along a balanced growth path in the context of a
two-sector endogenous growth model for the case of g > 0 and  = 1.
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if we assume that an optimal programme will seek to minimise distortions beyond an initial
period of high taxation, subsequent values of t must be bounded below and above over time:
1 <  < 1. Setting the bounds and rewriting the inequalities in logarithms yields:
ln

0
1


tX
i=1
ln

1 + F1 [Ki; ziLi] G1 [Ki; ziLi]  
1 + ri

 ln

0
1

; (24)
which implies that as the value of t in (23) evolves over a suciently long period of time,
it must on average be equal to one and the average distortion measured as deviations from
t = 1 approaches zero in the limit. Extending Judd (1999), this implies that for all t1  0,
any long-run constant value of r must satisfy:
lim
t2!1
1
t2
t1+t2X
i=t1
ln

1 + F1 [Ki; ziLi] G1 [Ki; ziLi]  
1 + r

= 0; (25)
which in turn implies that if the social planner must choose a particular constant tax rate, then:
Theorem 2. Assume there exists an interior solution for (13) to (20), for any t1  0, if the
value of r is xed, then the long-run optimal policy is to set it to satisfy (25).
Theorem 2 generalises Theorem 1 to economies that may not converge to balanced growth
paths or steady states. For example, if the dynamic behaviour of the economy is characterized
by permanent cycles, and r is to be xed to any value, it will be optimally so, if on average it
equals F1 [Kt; ztLt] G1 [Kt; ztLt]   and the long-run tax rate a on asset income is set to the
average value of G1 [Kt; ztLt] = (F1 [Kt; ztLt]  ). Yet this leaves the question of what is the
best policy if the policy maker is not necessarily constrained to choose xed values for rt and
at ?
To avoid the issue of time inconsistency, assume a policy maker commits to an innite
sequence of rt that need not be constant. An innite number of dierent sequences satisfy the
boundary conditions in (24) and hence also satisfy
lim
t2!1
1
t2
t1+t2X
i=t1
ln

1 + F1 [Ki; ziLi] G1 [Ki; ziLi]  
1 + ri

= 0: (26)
Yet only by committing to a policy of setting ri equal to F1 [Ki; ziLi]   G1 [Ki; ziLi]    and
tax rates ai equal to G1 [Ki; ziLi] = (F1 [Ki; ziLi]  ) in each period does a policy maker both
satisfy (25) and minimise deviations from t = 1.
Theorem 3. For a suciently large value of t1  0, an optimal tax policy for asset income is
such that the values of ri are set equal to F1 [Ki; ziLi] G1 [Ki; ziLi]  .
Proof. By satisfying (26) such a policy simultaneously minimizes deviations from t = 1 over
time and satises the boundary conditions in (24). It generalizes Theorem 6 in Judd (1999) as
well as Theorem 2 above to the case where the policy maker is not constrained to set tax rates
to one constant value.
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Theorem 3 can be implemented by setting the sequence of tax rates ai equal to
G1 [Ki; ziLi] = (F1 [Ki; ziLi]  ). There is however an obvious limitation to the practical ap-
plicability of the Theorem|the diculty in determining the appropriate size of the initial t1
periods during which the social planner may choose to set the tax rate on asset income very
high to exploit the short-term inelasticity in the supply of capital.3 Yet regardless of the length
of t1, we can utilize the intuition that underlies Theorem 3 to generate a useful conjecture about
how dierent tax policies are likely to compare. Once again we focus on the power function.
Conjecture 1. Suppose government consumption is a power function of net domestic product,
G [Kt; ztLt] = g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) : Then a policy of setting the sequence of tax rates ai equal
to G [Kt; ztLt] = (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt), which equals g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) 1 for all periods
t  0, weakly dominates a policy of xing a to any xed value. Furthermore, if  = 1, then the
policy of xing a = g strictly dominates the policy of xing a to any value a 6= g.
Setting aside the possibility of employing a \bang-bang" optimal control policy through
period t1, Conjecture 1 predicts how the welfare eects of dierent tax policies, if implemented
immediately, are likely to compare, and not merely over the long-run, if the relationship between
government consumption and net output takes a very particular form, the power function.
More generally, one possible interpretation of the function G [Kt; ztLt], one that general-
izes beyond the context of the strictly theoretical models considered in this section, is that
it expresses a long-run equilibrating relationship between government consumption and either
factor inputs or the economic output, net of depreciation, they generate. Provided government
consumption and net output are integrated I(1) processes, perhaps because they share a trend
driven by labor augmenting technology and/or population growth as in the model above, the
specic case of the power function is easily estimated, as it corresponds in its logarithmic form to
the cointegrating relationship in Johansen's Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). If capital
and eective labor are I(1) as well, it is also possible to replace net output with factor inputs
and establish the cointegrating relationship between capital and government expenditure that
is fundamental to the theory. In the next section I use the VECM to estimate both types of
relationship, and then in Section 4 I incorporate these estimates into the calibration of a model
designed to numerically evaluate the main implications of Conjecture 1.
3 Estimation: Error Correction Models for Government Con-
sumption
3.1 Government Consumption and Net Output
We start by examining the properties of government consumption Gt, and net domestic product
in the United States Yt, using quarterly data from the rst quarter of 1948 to the fourth quarter
3Chamley (1986) provides one method for approximating t1.
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of 2014. In Table 1, neither the augmented Dickey-Fuller, the Dickey{Fuller test with GLS
detrending, the Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock point-optimal test, Phillips-Perron test or Ng and
Perron's MZ, MZt, MSB and MPt tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the
1% critical level when applied to the levels of each series, but all reject the existence of unit
roots at the 1% level when applied to the series' rst dierences. Perron and Vogelsang's or
Zivot and Andrew's Dickey-Fuller tests which each accounts for breaks in both the trend or
constant (in levels) or the constant (in dierences) generate the same pattern, and fail to nd
evidence of spurious unit root behavior. Similarly, the KPSS test rejects the null hypothesis of
stationarity in the levels of each of the two series at the 1% level, but cannot reject the null
hypothesis when applied to dierences, as long as the test includes a deterministic time trend
(which in each case is statistically signicant).
For the ratio of the two series (log dierences) in the last two columns, the augmented Dickey-
Fuller and Phillips-Perron test each rejects the existence of a unit root at the 1% critical level.
Accounting for break points weakens but does not contradict these results and the Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) cannot reject the null hypothesis of stationarity of the ratio at
the 10% critical value (the deterministic time trend in KPSSt is not statistically signicant).
4
However the the Dickey{Fuller test with GLS detrending, the Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock point-
optimal test, Ng and Perron's MZ, MZt, and MPt cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit
root even at the 10% critical level. Together, these contradictory results could imply that if the
two series are cointegrated and characterized by the exponential relationship in Section 2 the
value of  might fall somewhere in the vicinity of one.
To test for cointegration, I begin by estimating an unrestricted VAR for the two time series.
The optimal lag length p for the estimated VAR indicated by the Aikake's information criterion,
Akaike's nal prediction error (FPE) and the likelihood ratio (LR) is q = 4, but Schwarz's
Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC)
indicate, as is often the case, a more parsimonious optimal lag length, q = 2, which is what I
choose to use. If government consumption and net domestic product do indeed share a common
stochastic trend, the largest eigenvalue of the system must be equal to one, and to guarantee
stability all the others must be (in modulus) less than one. The largest eigenvalue here is .997,
the next highest is .911, and the two complex eigenvalues 0.341 + .030i the fall well within the
unit circle.
To determine the cointegrating vector itself, I estimate the Vector Error Correction Model
4A Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test performed on an AR(1) estimation of the log ratio cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no breakpoints at a condence level of 5% when trimming 5, 10 or 15% of the data, though a Bai
Perron breakpoint test with 5% trimming suggests one or two possible breaks in the early 1950's coinciding with
large changes in defense spending associated with the beginning and end of the Korean War.
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Figure 3: Log dierences of government consumption, net domestic product and log capital,
quarterly in the United States, seasonally adjusted annual rate deated by the NDP deator,
1948Q1 to 2015Q4, natural logarithmic scale. Data Source: See caption in Figure 1.
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Method Gov. Consumption Net Domestic Product Gov. Cons./NDP
Level First Di. Level First Di. Level
ADF -2.678 -5.895 -1.678 -11.028 -4.328
DF-GLS -0.736 -3.540 -0.970 -6.543 -1.613
PT -GLS 46.307 0.948
 26.203 0.319 17.658
PP -2.916 -12.085 -1.509 -11.066 -3.849
MZ -2.916 -22.231
 -3.232 -66.434 -6.096
MZt -0.828 -3.296
 -1.008 -5.749 -1.658
MSB 0.377 0.148
 0.312 0.087 0.272
MPt 31.315 1.236
 23.092 0.402 14.900
DF-PV -4.352 -7.099 -3.595 -11.392 -4.811
DF-ZA -4.369 -8.207 -3.743 -8.576 -5.508
KPSSnt 2.137
yyy 0.564yy 2.181yyy 0.387y 0.214
KPSSt 0.356
yyy 0.071 0.391yyy 0.027 0.189yy
Table 1: Nominal data deated by NDP deator, in natural logarithms. ADF is the augmented
Dickey{Fuller test. DF-GLS is the Dickey{Fuller test with GLS detrending. PT -GLS is the
Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock point-optimal test statistic. PP is the Phillips-Perron test. MZa,
MZt, MSB, and MPt are the modied tests in Ng and Perron (2001). DF-PV and DF-ZA
are the Perron and Vogelsang and Zivot and Andrews unit root tests with intercept and trend
breaks. All these tests are conducted with a constant term and trend for levels and ratios, and
a constant term only for rst dierences. Finally, KPSSnt is the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin test without deterministic time trend while KPSSt includes the trend.
 Reject the null
hypothesis of a unit root at the 10% condence level.  Reject the null hypothesis of a unit root
at the 5% condence level.  Reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1% condence
level. y Reject the null hypothesis of stationarity at the 10% condence level. yy Reject the
null hypothesis of stationarity at the 5% condence level, yyy Reject the null hypothesis of
stationarity at the 1% condence level.
(VECM):
lnGt
lnYt

=

G
Y

(lnGt 1    lnYt 1   ln g) (27)
+
qX
i=1

GG (i) GY (i)
Y G (i) Y Y (i)

lnGt i
lnYt i

+

G
Y

+

"G;t
"Y;t

;
where G and Y represent the spead of adjustment, the vector (1; )
0 represents the normalised
cointegrating vector and g is a constant. If  = 1, then the long-run relationship between
government consumption and net domestic product is a xed proportion, represented by the
constant term g. Together  and g correspond to the parameters in the power function that
expresses the long-run relationship between government consumption and net output in Section
2.
Dene the 22 matrix  

G
Y
 
1 

. From Johansen's trace and maximum eigen-
value test in Table 2 we can reject the null of no cointegrating vector at nearly any reasonable
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Rank Eigen. Trace p-Value Max-Eigen. p-Value
0
1
0.092
0.013
29.402
3.416
<0.001
0.065
25.986
3.416
0.001
0.065
Table 2: Johansen's trace and maximum eigenvalue tests along with information criteria for the
rank of the matrix  for government consumption and net domestic product.
condence level but do not reject the hypothesis of one cointegrating vector (rather than full
rank). Together this implies that (1; )0 represents a valid cointegrating vector that, together
with the estimated value of g, represents the long-run relationship between government con-
sumption and net domestic product.5
Given the contradictory results the dierent tests for the stationarity of the ratio between
government consumption and net output yield, it is not surprising that the estimate of  = 0:927
in the unrestricted vector error correction model (27) in column (1) of Table 3 is close to, yet
still more than two and a half standard deviations from one. Hence we can reject the restriction
of  to one in column (2) with a p-value of 0.008. The estimate of G is statistically signicant
but the estimate of Y is not, implying that net output is weakly exogenous.That is consistent
with the theoretical model in Section 2 which implies that government consumption is directly
determined by the values of the parameters g and  and the level of economic activity. Hence
we cannot reject the restriction that the value of Y is zero in column (3), in which case the
value of  rises slightly to 0:935. However we can reject, at least a the 5% level, the imposition
of both constraints in column (4).
So what do the results in Table 3 tell us about optimal tax policy? First, if we do impose
the constraint  = 1, the optimal long-run tax on asset income is simply equal to the value of
g or 0.184 which is also the long-run average share of government consumption in net output
between 1948 and 2015. By contrast, if  < 1, as our estimates imply, and the size of the
economy continues to grow in the future, either because of per-capita output growth or the
increasing size of the work force, the share devoted to government consumption declines as its
growth fails to completely keep pace with that of net output. As mentioned in Section 2, such
scale eects mean the limiting optimal tax rate as t ! 1 coincides with the Chamley-Judd
rate of zero.
Yet immediately setting the rate of tax to zero would not minimise distortions as described
in Theorem 3. Even if we believe the estimated power relationship is stable over long periods of
time, decades or even centuries may pass before the value of g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) 1 decays
by any signicant amount.
5Wickens (1996) demonstrates that the particular factorisation of  chosen by VECM is not necessarily
economically meaningful and the estimated cointegrating vector is an unknown linear transform of the underlying
long-run structural relationship. However this critique is not pertinent to the estimation of a single structural
equation such as the power function relationship estimated here.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
 lnGt lnYt lnGt lnYt lnGt lnGt
Cointegrating eq.
 0:927 1 0:935 1
(0:025) (0:025)
g 0:248 0:184 0:240 0:184
Error correction
G; Y  0:059  0:007  0:055  0:003  0:060  0:056
(0:012) (0:008) (0:013) (0:009) (0:012) (0:013)
 lnGt 1 0:227  0:066 0:251  0:061 0:228 0:251
(0:058) (0:043) (0:059) (0:042) (0:058) (0:059)
 lnGt 2 0:173 0:035 0:201 0:038 0:176 0:201
(0:058) (0:042) (0:058) (0:042) (0:057) (0:058)
 lnYt 1 0:067 0:337 0:096 0:348 0:068 0:096
(0:085) (0:062) (0:085) (0:062) (0:085) (0:085)
 lnYt 2 0:001 0:101 0:018 0:115  0:001 0:018
(0:086) (0:063) (0:087) (0:063) (0:086) (0:087)
G; Y 0:004
 0:004 0:003 0:004 0:004 0:003
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
R2 0:250 0:161 0:230 0:161 0:250 0:230
R2 0:236 0:146 0:215 0:144 0:236 0:215
F -statistic 17:542 10:128 15:683 9:984 17:548 15:683
Constraints  = 1 Y = 0  = 1;
Y = 0
Likelihood Value 1624:087 1620:537 1623:777 1620:491
LR Statistic 7:101 0:621 7:19
Deg. of Freed. 1 1 2
p-Value 0:008 0:431 0:027
Table 3: Estimated Vector Error Correction Model for US data on government consumption
and net domestic product, 1948Q1 to 2015Q4. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Method Capital Eective Labor Gov. Cons./Capital
Level First Di. Level First Di. Level
ADF -1.233 -4.659 -1.674 -13.092 -3.493
DF-GLS -1.022 -4.638 -1.273 -13.109 -1.213
PT -GLS 22.932 0.856
 21.457 0.236 29.040
PP -0.911 -11.361 -1.550 -13.149 -3.662
MZ -4.879 -33.700
 -4.176 -128.632 -3.687
MZt -1.351 -4.058
 -1.254 -7.993 -1.245
MSB 0.277 0.120
 0.300 0.062 0.338
MPt 17.609 0.870
 19.999 0.236 23.084
DF-PV -2.581 -5.541 -3.325 -13.536 -4.956
DF-ZA -3.077 -5.443 -3.760 -7.386 -4.965
KPSSnt 2.173
yyy 0.384y 2.151yyy 0.248 0.923yyy
KPSSt 0.357
yyy 0.072 0.260yyy 0.046 0.152yy
Table 4: Nominal data deated by NDP deator, in natural logarithms. For description of the
tests, see caption in Table 1
3.2 Government Consumption and Factor Inputs
It is the underlying connection between government consumption and capital that generates
the policy prescriptions in Theorems 1 through 3. Is there in fact a cointegrating relationship
between government consumption and the two aggregate factor inputs, and in particular to
capital? First, to generate data for the total capital stock Kt at a quarterly frequency in
Figures 1 and 2, I using the quarterly rates of change in private capital estimated by Fernald
(2014) to interpolate quarterly estimates of total xed assets between the available end of year
gures. Then using nominal gross domestic product, and assuming a constant returns to scale
Cobb-Douglas production function, I employ simple growth accounting to generate a series that
corresponds to eective labor, ztLt. When applied to each factor input, the unit roots tests in
Table 4 reveal a pattern similar to those in Table 1|alone each series is I(1) but tests on the
ratio of government consumption to capital yield results that are as contradictory as those for
the ratio of government consumption to net output.
When applied to estimates of unrestricted vector autoregressions with the logarithm of
government expenditure lnGt, the logarithm of aggregate capital lnKt, and the logarithm of
eective labor ln (ztLt), SBIC once again suggests the optimal number of lags is equal to 2.
The eigenvalues of the system are stable, the largest equal to 0.998, and the next highest 0.971.
Both Johansen's trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for cointegration in Table 5 support the
existence of one and only one cointegrating vector.
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Rank Eigen. Trace p-Value Max-Eigen. p-Value
0
1
2
0.078
0.032
0.008
32.846
10.817
2.106
0.022
0.223
0.147
22.029
8.710
2.106
0.037
0.311
0.147
Table 5: Johansen's trace and maximum eigenvalue tests along with information criteria for the
rank of the matrix  for government consumption, aggregate capital and eective labor.
The counterpart here to (27) is:0@ lnGtlnKt
ln (ztLt)
1A =
0@ GK
zL
1A (lnGt 1    lnKt 1    (1  ) ln (zt 1Lt 1)   ln  ln g) (28)
+
qX
i=1
0@ GG (i) GK (i) GzL (i)KG (i) KK (i) KzL (i)
zLG (i) zLK (i) zLzL (i)
1A0@  lnGt ilnYt i
ln (zt iLt i)
1A+
0@ GY
zL
1A+
0@ "G;t"Y;t
"zL;t
1A ;
where  relates to the rate of depreciation, or more precisely represents the ratio between net
domestic product Yt and gross domestic product ~Yt = Yt + Kt. I treat this as a constant and
set its value to its long-run average between 1948 to 2015, =0:889.6 Given that the series
for eective labor was constructed using a constant returns to scale production technology, the
value of the estimated coecients on lnKt 1 and ln (zt 1Lt 1) in (28) must by construction
equal , which allows me to isolate the value of g from the estimate of the constant in the
cointegrating vector.
The unrestricted estimates of the model in the columns labeled (1) in Table 6 imply values
of  = 0:441, g = 0:252 and  = 0:887|the latter two estimates are not signicantly dierent
from the corresponding estimates in Table 3.7 The constraint that the sum of the values of the
two coecients in (28) are equal to one can be rejected at the 1% level. However, once again
the estimates this time of K and zL suggest that both aggregate capital and eective labor are
weakly exogenous, and this is conrmed in the column labeled (2) where the p-value associated
with the constraint is 0.607. In this specication the estimates imply:  = 0:476, g = 0:230
and  = 0:897. The column labeled (3) includes estimates where the constraints  = 1 as well
as K = 0 and zL = 0. Here the p-value associated with the constraint is only 0.011, so we
can once again reject this additional restriction. Again the estimates in both Tables 3 and 6
conrm what the tests for stationarity of the ratios in Tables 1 and 4 suggest|that the value
of  is close to, yet statistically speaking, signicantly less than one.
6Estimating  as the constant term in the cointegrating vector for Yt 1 and ~Yt 1 yields nearly identical
results.
7The restriction that =0.927 cannot be rejected at a probability of 0.232.
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(1) (2) (3)
 lnGt lnKt ln (ztLt)  lnGt lnGt
Cointegrating eq.
 0:391 0:427 0:231
(0:147) (0:143) (0:192)
 (1  ) 0:496 0:470 0:769
(0:159) (0:154) (0:192)
g 0:252 0:230 0:217
Error correction
G; K ; zL  0:051  0:003  0:012  0:052  0:038
(0:011) (0:004) (0:014) (0:013) (0:012)
 lnGt 1 0:253  0:020 0:201 0:256 0:283
(0:060) (0:023) (0:079) (0:060) (0:061)
 lnGt 2 0:176 0:084 0:069 0:180 0:199
(0:060) (0:023) (0:079) (0:060) (0:062)
 lnKt 1  0:238 0:345  0:132  0:231  0:210
(0:154) (0:060) (0:203) (0:154) (0:158)
 lnKt 2 0:126 0:167  0:173 0:133 0:172
(0:154) (0:059) (0:202) (0:153) (0:157)
 ln (zt 1Lt 1) 0:030 0:045 0:139 0:031 0:031
(0:047) (0:018) (0:062) (0:047) (0:048)
 ln (zt 2Lt 2) -0:047  0:026 0:067  0:046  0:048
(0:048) (0:018) (0:063) (0:048) (0:049)
G; K ; zL 0:006
 0:003 0:006 0:005 0:005
(0:002) (0:001) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
R2 0:234 0:272 0:098 0:233 0:199
R2 0:213 0:253 0:074 0:213 0:178
F -statistic 11:369 13:955 4:073 11:377 10:509
Constraints Y = 0  = 1;
Y = 0
Likelihood Value 2489:455 2488:957 2483:863
LR Statistic 0:998 11:185
Deg. of Freed. 2 3
p-Value 0:607 0:011
Table 6: Estimated Vector Error Correction Model for US data on government consumption,
aggregate capital stock and eective labor, 1948Q1 to 2015Q4. Standard errors in parentheses.
21
Figure 4: Forecasts for the value of Gt=Yt from 2016Q1 to 2100Q4 derived from the vector
error correction model with net output in (27) and estimated in column (3) of Table 3, and the
model with factor outputs in (28) estimated in column (2) of Table 6. Grey shading indicates
condence bands of 90%, 95% and 99%.
3.3 Forecasting the Optimal Time Path for the Tax Rate
How then should a government that wishes to set policy well in advance, choose to set tax rates?
One option is to set them to either the long run average ratio of government consumption to
net output, or the estimates of g in columns (2) and (4) in Table 3 or column (3) in Table 6.
That means setting the tax rate to a constant value of between 0.184 and 0.217, depending
on which estimate is chosen. Alternatively, as the likelihood ratio tests consistently imply we
can reject the constraint that sets  = 1 with a high degree of condence, it might be more
appropriate for the government to choose a path of taxes that matches the future values of
g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) 1 that the vector error correction models forecast.8
It is the behavior of factor inputs, and the net output they generate, that determines gov-
ernment expenditure in the theoretical model in Section 2. Hence the versions of the vector
error correction models that most closely match that theoretical model are those where net
output in Table 3, or inputs in Table 6, are weakly exogenous. As in fact, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that constrains Y , K , or zL to equal zero but can reject constraining  to equal
1, I will use the estimates in columns (3) in Table 3 and (2) in Table 6 to generate long-run
forecasts of g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) 1 in Figure 4 that begin in the rst quarter of 2016 and
continue to the last quarter of 2100. These coincide with the optimal tax rates on asset income
implied by both Theorem 3 and Conjecture 1 in Section 2.
When the estimates from Table 3 are used, the forecasts of g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) 1 cor-
responding to column (3) imply an optimal policy that entails slowly lowering the tax rate on
8Note that in the theoretical model this term exactly equals the ratio of government expenditure to net out-
put, but forecasts of G [Kt; ztLt] = (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) can diverge somewhat from g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) 1 .
The former contains the independent behaviour of government consumption not explained by the cointegrating
relationship. That part of its behavior is not relevant for determining the optimal tax rate on asset income.
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asset income from 0.156 at the beginning of 2016, to 0.130 the end of 2100. If we rely on the
estimates in column (2) of Table 6, the optimal tax rate is somewhat lower, dropping from an
initial value of 0.121 and reaching 0.094 at the end of the century. In each case, the values
associated with the xed tax rates 0.184 and 0.217 mentioned above are not only signicantly
higher, but fall well outside even the 99% condence intervals.
Having established in this section a strong empirical case that government consumption
evolves as a function of net output, or indeed the aggregate factor inputs that generate it, and
having already demonstrated in the previous section how such an assumption alters the nature
of optimizing scal policy, I consider in the next section the quantitative welfare implications
of shifting the burden of tax between income generated from asset holdings and labor earnings,
using these estimates. Is Conjecture 1 valid for these sets of parameter choices? Given that it
is far easier to implement a xed rate of tax on asset income, I can evaluate how much of the
maximum potential welfare gain is sacriced if that is the policy adopted. Furthermore, I can
not only measure the welfare benet of implementing these dierent policies, but also evaluate to
what degree, in terms of welfare, the small dierences between the dierent estimated versions
in (27) and (28) matter when used to inform tax policy.
4 Welfare Analysis
The purpose of this section is to numerically assess the theories and conjecture in Section 2,
so as to quantify the magnitude of the welfare eects they imply for the US economy while
incorporating the estimates from Section 3 regarding the relationship between government con-
sumption and net output, and to juxtapose these results with those predicted by the canonical
Chamley-Judd formulation, where government consumption is assumed to be growing at a xed
exogenous rate. To proceed, I assume a functional form for the utility function
u [ct; lt] = ln ct   l
1+ 1
v
t
1 + 1v
(29)
where v corresponds to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. I also assume that the aggregate
production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
F [Kt; ztLt] = K

t (ztLt)
1  : (30)
To compare the welfare implications of shifts in scal policy, I calculate compensating dif-
ferentials, measured in terms of a permanent increase in consumption. More formally, dene
fat gTt=1 as the sequence of tax rates on asset income associated with the new scal policy we
wish to evaluate. The value of T may be nite or innite, depending on whether the policy
is assumed to be temporary or permanent. Such a policy generates ows of consumption and
labor fct; ltg1t=0, which can then be compared to
n
ct; lt
o1
t=0
, the agents' counterfactual ows
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Parameters and Initial Tax Rates
 0.320
 c 0.050
a 0.449
Discount Rate and Depreciation (Quarterly)
 0.9953
 0.0098
Exogenous Growth Rates (Quarterly)
Nt=Nt 1 0.003
zt=zt 1 0.005
Initial Asset Holdings (as Ratio of Annual Gross Output)
B0=F [K0; z0L0] 0.921
K0=F [K0; z0L0] 2.908
Table 7: The calibrated parameters of the model. The eective tax rate on asset income a is
the rate prior to policy changes and is calibrated using the procedure in Trabandt and Uhlig
(2011).
of consumption and labor given the initial tax policy. The compensating dierential is


at jTt=0

= e 
P1
t=0 
tNte
P1
t=0 
tNt

ln
ct
ct
+ v
1+v

l
1+ 1v
t  l
1+ 1v
t

  1: (31)
The welfare implications of dierent policies can now be evaluated by feeding their associated
impulse responses into (31), all the while assuming that the tax on labor earnings adjusts
endogenously to keep the debt burden xed over time.
4.1 Calibration
Microeconometric estimates of the Frisch elasticity labor supply vary from nearly zero to 0.5
for men and slightly higher for women. Surveying the recent literature, Reichling and Whalen
(2012) conclude that a value of 0.4 provides the best central estimate, and this is the one
employed by the Congressional Budget Oce. By contrast, most dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models assume elasticities of one or two. Here I consider the two most extreme
values analysed by Keane and Rogerson (2012): v=0.1 and v=2. As will be demonstrated below,
the welfare eects generated by shifting the tax burden between capital and labor are remarkably
robust to these two very dierent assumptions about the magnitude of this parameter, obviating
the need to consider the implications of intermediate values.
I use the estimates in Tables 3 and 6 of the cointegrating vectors in (27) and (28) to set the
values of g and . Given the potential scale eects in this economy when 0 <  < 1, it seems
most appropriate to use long-run averages for the underlying growth rates for population and
labor augmenting technology. Hence for both Nt=Nt 1 and zt=zt 1, the growth rates match
the average growth rates from 1948 to 2015 (quarterly), where I assume that for an economy
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close to the balanced growth path the latter can be approximated by the per-capita growth
rate of gross domestic product. Similarly, the values of the factor share of capital in output
, depreciation  and the initial capital-output ratio K0=F [K0; z0L0] are taken from the mean
value of the data from this period used in Section 3. Tax rates are calculated using the available
data from 1970 to 2014, following the procedure employed by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) and
using both the OECD and the European Union's AMECO databases. I choose the value of the
subjective quarterly discount factor  that is consistent with the evolution of the Euler equation
for consumption, given the long-run rates of growth, factor shares, the tax rate on assets and
the capital output ratio.
Throughout, I constrain all shifts in scal policy to be fully nanced|changes in the tax rate
on asset income are fully compensated by osetting changes to the tax rate on labor earnings
that adjusts to maintain a constant ratio of public debt to output|both on and o the balanced
growth path|all the while the ad valorem tax rate on consumption remains constant.9 Instead
of averaging over the preceding years, I choose for this ratio the sum of publicly held US federal,
state and local debt relative to gross output at the end of 2015Q4.10
4.2 Implications of the constrained estimates:  = 0 versus  = 1
Before considering the implications of the theoretical and empirical results from Sections 2 and
3, it is worthwhile to rst examine how welfare would be aected by changes to US tax policy if,
as was assumed by Chamley (1981), (1986), and Judd (1985), (1999), government consumption
is exogenously determined. In our model, this is analogous to assuming that the value of  in
Sections 2 and 3 is equal to zero. Here, the immediate impact of any shift in the tax burden away
from income derived from assets and towards labor earnings is to immediately raise the after tax
rate of return on capital. This induces both an immediate drop in consumption and an increase
in the amount of labor agents supply. The combined eect is to initiate a long period of capital
accumulation during which de-trended per-capita consumption rst recovers and ultimately
exceeds its initial value, while the amount of labor gradually declines in response to both the
higher rate at which it is being taxed, and an income eect associated with a diminution of the
excess burden from capital income tax.
Inserting the impulse responses associated with dierent lower rates of taxation of asset
income into (31), the welfare eects, expressed as compensating dierentials in terms of per-
manent increases to consumption, increase as the burden of tax is shifted from assets and is
maximised (or nearly so) for the two curves labeled  = 0;  = 0:1 and  = 0;  = 2 in Figure
5 and Table 8, in a manner consistent with the Chamley-Judd results, when the tax on asset
9All impulse responses are calculated using a shooting algorithm. Programs available from the author by
request.
10Federal Debt Held by the Public [FYGFDPUN] and Liability of State and Local Govern-
ments, Excluding Employee Retirement Funds; Credit Market Instruments [SLGSDODNS]. Data Source:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
25
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Τ
a
Co
m
pe
ns
at
in
g
D
iff
er
en
tia
ls
Γ=0, Ν=0.1
Γ=0, Ν=2
g=0.185,
Γ=1
Ν=0.1 and
Ν=2
Figure 5: Welfare eects of lowering the tax rate on asset income from 0.449 in terms of
permanent increases in consumption for =0 and =1.
income is completely eliminated (a = 0).11 Reecting the logic of Harberger triangles, nearly
half the maximum welfare benet is achieved when the tax rate a is lowered from its initial
value of 0.449 to 0.35. Beyond that point marginal improvements in welfare decrease rapidly
reaching the equivalent of a 3.768% permanent increase in consumption if  = 0:1, and 3.602%
if  = 2 (denoted by  (0) in Table 8). The (rather small) dierence between the two welfare
measures reects the degree to which the higher taxes on labor are themselves distortionary
owing to the elasticity of the labor supply. Overall, the impact of eliminating the tax on asset
income is the equivalent in consumption terms of about six or seven quarters of per-capita
output growth.
Consider how this measure contrasts with the results when we use the values of the estima-
tion from columns (2) and (4) in Table 3, where  is constrained to equal one, and the estimated
11In fact the maximum is attained at the small positive rates of taxation of 0.004 and 0.026 when  = 0:1 and
 = 2, respectively (the rst two rows of Table 8). The reason is that the tax on asset income is immediately
reduced at the same time as it is announced. This has two contradictory eects on welfare: it reduces distortions
because of the elasticity of capital supply in the long run, but, because capital supply is inelastic in the short
run, it also bestows a costly lump-sum subsidy that the government must nance in the future. Only in the
vicinity of the point where the tax is eliminated, and the welfare benets of reducing the long-run distortions
are nearly exhausted, does the this latter eect dominate, particularly when the elasticity of labour supply is
relatively high. Even then it is too small to discern in Figure 5. Introducing a lag of two to three years between
the time the policy is announced and its implementation, eliminates this slight non-monotonicity.
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value of g corresponds to the long-run average share of government consumption in net domestic
product, 0.184. First, decreases in the tax rate on asset income generate patterns of welfare
changes, using the two dierent values of , that are so close together they are represented by
one curve in Figure 5. The elasticity of labor supply is nearly irrelevant here. Second, welfare
is maximised not at the zero tax rate, where the value of  (0) in Table 8 indicates a welfare
increase equivalent to a 1.103% to 1.105% increment to permanent consumption. Instead the
maximum welfare benet is attained at the value of a = 0:184, validating the prediction made
in Conjecture 1 that the optimal xed rate of tax a is equal to g. Indeed, although Theorem
1 refers to the long run, the results generated by an immediate and permanent change to the
tax rate conform with their predictions, and those of Theorem 2 as well. Third, the maximum
welfare gain, denoted by  (a) in Table 8, is equivalent to only a 1.491% to 1.495% permanent
increase in consumption, less than half of what pertains when  = 0 and the tax is eliminated.
The implication is that, though from the perspective of a welfare maximising representative
agent, the existing tax rate on asset income in the United States is presently set too high, the
maximum benet of reducing it is achieved when it is cut by slightly more than half, from 0.449
to 0.184, rather than by eliminating it completely. Furthermore, the maximal benet to welfare
that can be attained from any shift in the burden of taxation between asset income and labor
earnings is much smaller than is commonly asserted in the literature, because there, government
consumption is typically assumed not to respond to changes in the overall size of the economy.
4.3 Implications of the unconstrained estimates: 0 <  < 1, with constant
rates of taxation
Suppose the value of  is set between zero and one, in accordance with the estimates in Table
3 where the value of  remains unconstrained. Unlike the cases where  = 0 or  = 1, here the
share of government expenditure in net output, and hence also the optimal tax rate, decline
over time, as seen in the rst two rows of Figure 4. This also means that when considering the
welfare eects implied by a change in tax policy, not only are the new paths of consumption
and labor
n
ct; lt
o1
t=0
dynamic, but the paths associated with the initial policy

ct; lt
	1
t=0
, are
dynamic as well. Rather than considering the evolution of the economy as it adjusts from one
balanced growth path to another, the point of comparision here is an economy that is, before
the change in policy is initiated, already a very great distance from convergence to a balanced
growth path.
So if at the moment when the policy changes, the economy has not converged to a balanced
growth path, what starting point best matches the analysis above? More specically, given the
parameters, growth rates and initial tax rates in Table 7, along with particular estimated values
of  and g, is it possible to set the initial capital output ratio, the debt burden and the share
of government expenditure independently? The answer is no.
As explained in Sections 2 and 3, if the aggregate economy continues to grow because of
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Figure 6: Welfare eects of lowering the tax rate on asset income from 0.449 in terms of
permanent increases in consumption. The values of g and  correspond to the estimates using
net output in column (3) of Table 3, and using factor inputs in column (2) of Table 6.
population increaseNt=Nt 1 > 1, technological improvement zt=zt 1 > 1, or both, and the value
of  falls strictly between zero and one, the share of government consumption in net output
shrinks and any change in policy aects an economy that has not yet reached its balanced growth
path. Instead capital accumulates at a rate higher than what would be associated with natural
population growth or the evolution of labour augmenting technology. Hence, to ensure impulse
responses are monotonic, I assume that on impact the initial amount of per-capita physical
capital amounts to 95% of its long-run value. I maintain consistency between the dierent
versions of the model by keeping the same parameter values, hold xed the ratio of public debt to
annual output at 0.921 throughout, but allow the declining share of government expenditure to
initially be a bit higher than 0.184. Furthermore, to avoid the unrealistic outcome that the share
of government consumption in output ultimately approaches zero in the limit, I assume that
government consumption evolves according to the power function relationship G [Kt; ztLt] =
g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) from the initial period t = 0, when the new policy is announced and
implemented, to the end of period T   1, when it reaches g (F [KT 1; zT 1LT 1]  KT 1) .
From period T onward, subsequent government consumption evolves by simply growing at the
same exogenous rate as technology zt and population Nt. I set the values of T=340 which means
the period when government consumption is endogenous corresponds to the period between
2016Q1 till the end of the century, 2100Q4.
I proceed by rst considering policies identical to those analysed for the case of  = 1,
where the tax rate on asset income changes to a new xed value and then never changes again,
but using the values of g and  that correspond to the estimates from column (3) in Table 3
and column (2) in Table 6, where net output is weakly exogenous. Given that the estimated
values of  are relatively close in value to one, it is not surprising that the general pattern of
compensating dierentials in Figure 6 appears so similar to the curve that corresponds to  = 1
in Figure 5. Once again the complete abolition of the tax on asset income is welfare improving,
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because the initial tax rate of 0.449 is so very high. Overall the benets are not particularly
large, and again hardly inuenced by the value we choose for the elasticity of labor supply.
When I set  = 0:895, g = 0:240, corresponding to estimation of (28) in column (2) of
Table 6, the value of  (0) in Table 8 is the equivalent of only a 1.616% permanent increase
in consumption if v = 0:1, and drops to only 1.589% if the elasticity of labor supply is raised
to v = 2. If the social planner is constrained to immediately change the tax rate to one xed
value, the highest possible welfare improvement, the equivalent of a 1.858% [1.844%] increase
in consumption is achieved here if v = 0:1 [v = 2] and the tax rate on asset income is lowered
from its initial value of 0.449 to a =0.148 [a =0.151]. When the model is calibrated using
the estimation of (27) in column (3) of Table 3 the values of  (0) drop to 1.148% [1.123%] if
v = 0:1 [v = 2]. If v = 0:1 [v = 2], the planner attains the maximum welfare improvement
equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption equivalent to 1.543% [1.532%] by xing the
tax rate on asset income at a =0.183 [a =0.186].
Overall, given that the estimations in Tables 3 and 6 reject constraints that x the value of
=1, but not the assumption of weak exogeneity we are left to conclude that the optimal xed
rate of taxation on asset income is somewhere between 0.148 and 0.186. A policy of lowering tax
rates on asset income to within this range will produce the maximum welfare benet equivalent
to between a 1.532% and 1.858% increase in consumption, and no more. Given that the shapes
of the parabolas in Figure 6 atten out near their optima, any tax rate chosen within this region
will capture nearly all the potential welfare improvement that is possible.
4.4 Sequences with changing rates of tax
Suppose policy makers are no longer restricted to shifting between one xed rate of tax on
asset income and another as assumed in Theorem 2, but instead can choose tax rates that
change over time, in accordance with Theorem 3 and Conjecture 1. Let f~at g1t=1 denote the
sequence of tax rates that obtain when the model is simulated with the tax rate on asset income
set to equal g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) 1, and let  (~at ) denote the welfare eects in terms of
compensating dierentials, generated by adoption of this policy. Conjecture 1 indicates that the
improvements to welfare associated with setting the tax rate equal to g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) 1
should dominate the policy associated with the xed tax rates a. If  = 0 or  = 1, this
distinction is not meaningful, and the optimal policy is still to set the tax rate in each period to
at = 0 or 
a
t = g respectively, so the focus here is on those instances where 0 <  < 1. Again,
given that net output is growing, the value of g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) 1 declines and so any
sequence of optimal tax rates is declining over time as well. As before, to prevent the share of
government consumption from reducing to zero in the limit, I assume that from period T = 340
onwards, its share of net output stabililises.
In every case in Table 8, the values of  (~at ) are greater than  (
a), conrming the pre-
dictions of Conjecture 1. At the same time, the dierences are not large|allowing the tax
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 g v 100  (0) a 100  (a) 100  (~at ) 100  (~at )
0
0.1
2.0
3.768
3.602
0.004
0.026
3.769
3.609
0.894 0.230
0.1
2.0
1.616
1.589
0.148
0.151
1.858
1.844
1.865
1.850
1.822
1.806
0.935 0.240
0.1
2.0
1.148
1.123
0.183
0.186
1.543
1.532
1.550
1.536
1.508
1.493
1 0.185
0.1
2.0
1.103
1.105
0.184
0.184
1.491
1.495
Table 8: Optimising policies and corresponding welfare measures for dierent values of  and
g.
rate to vary yields only small increments to welfare beyond those already achieved by lowering
them to the relevant xed value a. If indeed the share of government expenditure continues
to gently decline before stabilising at the end of the century, the best this policy can achieve
is a welfare improvement of 1.865% in terms of permanent consumption for the case where
g = 0:230,  = 0:895 and v = 0:1, compared to 1.858% if the tax rate on asset income is xed
at 0.148. Once more, though the prevailing burden on asset income is considerably higher than
is optimal, the potential benets of reducing it are still far more modest than is often assumed
to be the case.
Finally, for completeness' sake, consider the welfare implications of introducing, not
the sequence of tax rates on asset income denoted by f~at g1t=1 that match the values of
g (F [Kt; ztLt]  Kt) 1, as calculated within the model simulation, but rather the sequence
of forecasts generated by the estimation of the models (27) and (28) in Figure 4. The compen-
sating dierentials, designated as  (~at ) in Table 8 are uniformly lower than either  (~
a
t ) or
 (a) for each parameterisation of the model, but the dierences are not substantial. Either
way, it seems that a policy of xing the tax rate on asset income to the appropriate level a in
Table 8 is one that both is easy to implement and secures much of any potential welfare benet
that can be attained by reforming scal policy.
5 Conclusion
Peacock and Wiseman's study The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom, rst
published in 1961, was partly motivated by the desire to test a proposition rst stated by Adolph
Wagner in 1883:
The \law of increasing expansion of public, and particularly state, activities" be-
comes for the scal economy the law of increasing expansion of scal requirements.
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Both the State's requirements grow and, often more so, those of local authori-
ties.....That law is the result of empirical observation in progressive countries, at
least in our Western European civilization; its explanation, justication and cause
is the pressure for social progress and the resulting changes in the relative spheres
of private and public economy, especially compulsory public economy. Financial
stringency may hamper the expansion of state activities, causing their extent to be
conditioned by revenue rather than the other way round, as is more usual. But in
the long run the desire for development of a progressive people will always overcome
these nancial diculties.12
Their work appeared to conrm Wagner's prediction that government expenditure would
not only grow with the size of the economy, it would take an increasing share of output|they
found that government consumption of goods and services rose from 6.6% to 22.7% of gross
national product in the years between 1890 and 1955 (spending on transfers and subsidies rose
from 2.3% to 13.9%). Similarly, in the US current government expenditure between 1948 and
2015 rose from 24.5% to 39.4% of net domestic product. But this is where the comparison
ends. When we conne ourselves to the resources consumed by the government, consumption
grows with the economy, but as a share of net output, it is either stable, or as implied by my
estimates, declining very slowly. This is more consistent with the type of relationship described
by an American contemporary of Wagner, Henry Carter Adams, writing in 1898:
On the contrary, it seems reasonable to assume that with each increment in the social
product the people will conceive it to be to their advantage to invest added sums
in the machinery of government. From the point of view of investment, therefore,
as well as from a consideration of the satisfaction to be secured from the activities
of the State, may we conclude that the scal demands of government will increase
along with, if not in proportion to, the general social income.13
Given the high eective rates of taxation on net asset income that currently prevail in the
United States, any reduction, including all the way to zero, will yield some welfare benet.
Nonetheless, once the link between government consumption and net output is recognised, the
optimality of setting the tax rate to zero and shifting the burden to labor earnings disappears.
Instead a more modest shift, one that would see the rate of tax on asset income drop by
slightly more than half, will yield the highest welfare improvement. Moreover, the potential
welfare gain is less than half what we would expect if we ignore the linkage between government
consumption and output. This result is highly robust to both the alternative specications of
12Adolph Wagner, Finanzwissenschaft, Third edition, Leipzig 1883. Translated to English by Nancy Cooke in
Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock, ed. Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, New York: St Martin's
Press,1967, pg. 8.
13Henry Carter Adams, The Science of Finance: An Investigation of Public Expenditures and Public Revenues,
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1898, pg. 39.
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the cointegrating relationship between government consumption and either net output or the
underlying factor inputs, as well as the widest plausible range of possible values for the elasticity
of labor supply.
The policy implication of this paper, that an ecient scal policy is one that sets the tax
on asset income to a positive rate only slightly below the rate of tax on labor earnings, is in
qualitative terms nearly identical to that in Reis (2011). In her paper the taxing authority
cannot distinguish between entrepreneurial labor income and returns to capital. Similarly,
Correia (1996) demonstrates that if some productive factors cannot be taxed, some of the burden
of nancing government expenditure should fall on capital income. Banks and Diamond (2010)
cite these considerations as underpinning their rejection of zero taxation of asset income in
their recommendations published in the Mirlees Report (2010) which studied possible reforms
to the United Kingdom's tax system. A parallel strand of the literature rst developed by
Aiyagari (1995) argues in favour of taxing the income derived from capital as a means of
suppressing its overaccumulation because uninsurable idiosyncratic risk leads to precautionary
saving. However, there is no reason to assume that a model that incorporates both mechanisms,
the endogeneity of government consumption and the diculty of distinguishing between or
imposing a tax on some productive inputs, will generate yet higher optimal taxes on asset
income that compound these two eects.
Similarly much of the literature on optimal taxation derived in a Mirleesian, rather than
a Ramsey framework, generally implies positive asset income taxation as well. However the
underlying mechanism that justies taxes in a Mirleesian model of optimal taxation, the asym-
metry in the availability of information available to agents and the tax authority as in Golosov
et al. (2003), is unlikely to interact with the reasoning based on the endogeneity of government
consumption here, in any manner that would indicate that two arguments should be taken
together to justify rates of tax higher than those implied by each argument in isolation.14
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